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OPEN DISCUSSION
PROFESSOR LANGE: This is so remarkably rich that it is hard
to know how to begin to comment. Let me say two things that come at
once to mind; The first is that the derivative works problem that you
have in mind surely does play a major role in the problems that we are
meeting here today to discuss. But it is not merely here that the derivative works right is a problem, or is it reailly merely the derivative works
right itself? It also plays itself out in infringement theory, which would
have to be changed correspondingly as well in order, were it to be addressed as the problem that it is, in order to bring about the change
that you have in mind, because, of course, now we just have to borrow
Mel Nimmer's language for it. We cannot continue to recognize comprehensive nonliteral similarity without encountering exactly the problem that you do have in mind. So it is a very comprehensive and recurring encounter in copyright law which could be corrected, no doubt,
through a serious modification to the organic law that you have in mind
and mean to propose. And I assume probably, reality being what it is,
that in one fashion or another, we will move in the direction that you
and Dennis [Karjala] and Ray [Patterson] and I think Jessica [Litman] envision. I do not have profound misgivings about that because it
is, after all, a system that we have lived with for some time and we do
have antecedents that we can use and that you have done a magnificent, really magnificent is not too strong a word to use, a magnificent
job of elaborating how we might make that approach.
I just want to close my preliminary response, however, by saying
that I think that we may underestimate the utility in the Coasean
model as how to transact business among us too quickly when we prefer this increasing, and now newly elaborate, regulatory scheme to the
kinds of examples that would begin to manifest themselves in a world
ordered in this other fashion. Because when I think about contract law
with its manifold problems and manifest problems, I nonetheless can
envision no setting in which I would not prefer contract models to the
regulatory model, so long as what usually happens when the contract
model is followed in important settings were not permitted to happen,
which is that the contract model would then become augmented at the
instance of one pressure group or another by small change regulatory
schemes that would then have the effect of actually nullifying the way
in which contracts work in a very large way. Let me call into play the
example that the motion picture industry faces in the rental market for
its works. Now this may seem distant from our concern, but as an analog, I think it is not useless. The industry tries to make use in what is,
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in any event, an almost utterly feckless way of contractual limitations
on the reproduction of copies of works which are circulated through
rental markets. It is an almost utterly feckless kind of limitation because, despite the fact that every time you put the cassette into your
player and scroll up the credits you see first this FBI warning that assures you in solemn and absolutely empty tones that you will be investigated by the FBI should you copy the work, no one-well, I should not
say no one because I actually know a few people that do-but very few
people pay the least attention to that at all. And this is so, even though
it is augmented by-the-truth of the matter is that in contract terms,
when you get down to them, where the terms do not make sense and
that is the point I want to make, where they do not, in fact, make sense
inter partes, what then arises is a canon of construction of contracts
that had its origins in the late thirties when the studio system in
Hollywood was at its heyday. It is the canon of construction that when
you get down to it, a contract is something that we can renegotiate, and
it has, in short, very little binding effect at all among parties who do
not think themselves suitably served in a continuing way. It would be a
hell of a cold day, for example, before Paul Sheils is able to pursue the
contract in enough forums to make it work, except in those settings in
which its effect plays itself out very nicely. I guess, in short, if I could
choose, I would rather have that setting than the one you envision,
though the one you envision is humane, intelligent, and brilliant, and
well suited in regulatory terms to what the need appears to be.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: David [Lange], the observation is
really very well taken. I think that some of you know that Randy Davis, Mitchell Kapor, Pam Samuelson, and I are working on a practical
model, and we would have to be prepared to show that it was better or
as good as any other model influenced by a Coasean calculus. And one
of the beauties of the modified copyright approach is that it does enable
the market to determine value; it is a very soft form of protection.
Therefore, it should interfere as little as possible with the overlay of
Coasean thinking and the positive aspects of that approach. We do
think, though, that a pure Coasean analysis would be insufficient, if you
mean by that a market totally devoid of intellectual property protection. Most of the innovators' venture capital would not follow a pure
Coasean system in our view.
MR. SHELLS: Jerry [Reichman], I would just like to make an
observation on behalf of the online database proprietors that may be in
the room. I think that comments by Marybeth [Peters] this morning
and you this morning and Jessica [Litman] yesterday pose an interesting dilemma for us. I think David Lange's comment was trying to get
at: Should an online database proprietor, faced with the uncertainties
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of registering of factual compilations in the Copyright Office and potentially disastrous results of having it rejected, and the problems you
raised this morning with respect to charges of copyright abuse or copyright misuse in the form of license agreement, abandon copyright as a
form of protection and simply rely on contract law?
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: My answer would vary depending
on whether you want a theoretical or practical perspective. From a theoretical perspective, one need not assume that the state will continue to
allow unlimited freedom of contract in this area. If I am not mistaken,
the European Community will favor private and educational uses of
noncopyrightable databases under its proposed Directive, for example.
As a practical matter, what would I advise the industry to do? I
would not advise them to abandon copyright when they could get it,
but I would advise them to exercise restraint and avoid the kind of
abuses I heard about during the OTA Advisory Board meetings this
year. We had a prominent librarian who was complaining about the
number and magnitude of these abuses and the amount of time and
resources and personnel it would take to negotiate license agreements if
they were to resist them and not just sign on the dotted line. I would
say, as I think David Lange or somebody pointed out yesterday, doing
the things that you are doing is consistent with your job as lawyers,
which is to protect the proprietary values of the gatherer of the
information.
I do believe you ought to think a lot about the implications for
research of what you are doing, however, and about blanket licensing in
the libraries, for example, and about not going "per use" at every opportunity. In sum, do not extract all that the maximum bargaining
power could temporarily yield, lest it boomerang against you when the
librarians' protests reach the congressional committees. I have not seen
enough of the present contracts to form a more detailed opinion, but I
have seen some examples that suggest certain contractfial clauses, if
imposed on educational institution, will cause research costs to rise
enormously.
MR. SHELLS: I understand the restrictions and obligations on the
proprietors to create reasonable and fair restrictions. My concern is
whether or not we have concluded that copyright is a dangerous thing
for us to try to claim and that we should instead rely exclusively on
contract and not try to copyright these databases.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: If it is copyrightable, relying or not
relying on the copyright will not change the public's rights under the
copyright laws, so the tension is still there. If I can claim that your
work is copyrightable and subject to my claim for fair use, I am going
to assert
it whether 1991
you registered it or not. This follows in part from
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the changes under the 1976 Act, especially the automatic copyright
principle. Now, you may try to impose other rights on me, and I would
come. back to you and say, look, this is copyrightable, the copyright
laws give me this, and your clause is inconsistent with my rights-so
what about it, Your Honor?
MR. SHELLS: I think that raises the issue though. To the extent
that I am, not copyrighting my work and do not claim a copyright on
my work, do I have better protection for my use restrictions?
MS. PETERS: You have it. If it is copyrightable, you have got it.
It does not matter whether you register it or not.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: It is not like a patent.
MS. PETERS: As a practical matter, as I said, if you want to get
to the Copyright Office, it is very easy to do that by adding additional
material, and you know the magic words. The magic words are judgment. You know, you can play that game. I do not think that is the
issue.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Your approach is very sound from
the patent perspective. Often there are very good reasons not to go into
patent law even when you can get the patent because there are all of
these tricky .hang-ups and you really can not. avoid them. Provided you
have got the contracts and you are controlling, there are very good reasons. This is very new area. We do not know the answer, but I do not
think you can avoid somebody's claim for copyright. They are going to
come in on their copyright rights whether you claimed it or not, because the statute's concept is that "copyright subsists from creation,"
you do not have to do anything to perfect it; you have got it, but so do
we.
THE CHAIRMAN: Paul [Sheils], is your question one in an infringement context of whether you bring in a claim for copyright
infringement?
MR. SHELLS: No. It is trying to increase the validity and enforceability of my contract. I want it to be protected against copyright
misuse claims.
THE CHAIRMAN: Did. that not come up in the infringement
context where you have a question of: Do I file a contract claim and a
copyright claim or just a contract claim and because the latter is
stronger because I do not have a copyright clouding the issue?
MR. SHELLS: It could be that, or it could be simply a response to
someone objecting to the enforceability of the contract based upon my
misuse of the copyright.
PROFESSOR LANGE: Could I just weigh in on Paul Sheils' side
of this sort of unfolding hypothesis. If you are correct in your thinking,
as I think you are that under 102 if you have it, you have got it, and
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/9
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that then changes the contract picture, which is what I really have
some doubt on. It seems to me that his out is simply formally abandon
copyright which he is quite free to do, at which point he does not have
it. So, that if indeed he concludes that he wants to be out of the copyright regime, in the way that you have in mind that continuingPROFESSOR REICHMAN: He dedicates it.
PROFESSOR LANGE: Right. He dedicates it. He dedicates it
formally at the moment of its creation and continuously every morning
as he goes to his office.
PROFESSOR LITMAN: Then he has dedicated it to the public
domain.
PROFESSOR LANGE: Precisely,. but that is exactly where we
begin. Then we are dealing with public domain works as to which it
happens. You understand he has to have some additional nexus in order
to make his contract claim work at all, and that is precisely where his
game begins.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Possession.
PROFESSOR LANGE: Right. I think at that point the appearance of weight in, for example, the fair use claim. I mean you have got
even more fair use; you have got the whole damn work. You cannot get
it unless you will deal with him, and you will deal with him or not
depending on whether or not his contract is fair, and so forth. If it is
not, then somebody else, probably Kurt Steele I judge from hearing
him, will come in and deal with it himself or somebody will and then I
will do a deal with him. I do not know why in theory that is notPROFESSOR REICHMAN: Empirically is it going to turn out
like that, anybody else can just up and do it? I doubt the market would
be as open as that.
PROFESSOR LANGE: That is the problem, Jerry [Reichman],
that I think you address, by implication when you say that you are
engaged in an empirical inquiry to that question. I do not know the
answer, but then I have never lived under anything but a copyright
dominant regime. I do not know, in fact, whether that would happen,
but certainly Ronald Coase would suggest that it would happen.
MR. SPIEGEL: I would like to extend that a little bit and ask
Professor Reichman a question. You paint a picture in your talk which
I think we can all imagine could be pretty frightening. If, in fact, the
technology were used to limit access to' huge amounts of information
without an overriding scheme to ensure that that information were in
some way, shape, manner, or form, made available to everyone, you
could end up with a new type of class society-those with access and
those without. Do you think that there is some underlying constitutional limitation to that restriction?

Published by eCommons, 1991

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:3

PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Professor Patterson would almost
certainly believe there is. I do not know. I think we would like to believe there is. I am less sure, maybe because I went to law school in a
legal realist period. I get nervous about the weight of older decisions on
newer decisions. I think there is a lot of room there for manipulation so
I am just less sure. I think it raises very serious constitutional problems
that could lead to constitutionally manipulated solutions. Whether they
are inevitable is something else. The fact remains that the empirical
reality is exactly as you have described it. We have not faced this problem. Before we had the printing press, what did we have? There is
actually a prize-winning French essay-I cannot remember the
name-that goes back and looks at the origins of copyright law in Roman law.
PROFESSOR LANGE: I cannot remember her name but she
talks about the scribal culture. Is that the work that you have in mind?
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Scribal culture.
PROFESSOR LANGE: That is interesting that you should raise
that, Jerry, because when she talks about-I cannot remember her
name.
PROFESSOR GORDON: Is it the Red Roses copyright paper by
Lacey?
PROFESSOR LANGE: No. That is sort of a narrowPROFESSOR REICHMAN: It is a French National Research
Counsel prize-winning thesis.
PROFESSOR LANGE: It is what Tom Palmer relies on in the
Austrian economics derived piece that he did first as a working paper
of George Mason and then published, if I remember right, in Hamline
Law Review. I guess my point to you is as I read her work, I think she
is talking about a system that transposed to our time would feel more
like a contract system than a regulatory system. I think that, in fact,
what was being reflected in those examples were deals.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: That is an astute observation.
Christine Carreau, is that it? Marite Edouard d'Artur, is that it?
Etude sur Le Droit d'Auteur; that is the title, and it is very interesting.
You are reading it from a Coasean perspective, and I am reading it
from this perspective.
PROFESSOR LANGE: I am not really a. Coasean exactly.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: It was done by Connor.
PROFESSOR LANGE: I want a little help from my friends, that
is all.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: There you are, but she professes to
see that there was quite a bit of help from rudimentary copyright law
in Roman times. The point is that when the printing press arrives, all
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/9
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this changes, and we have these five or six centuries during which we
encounter exactly the opposite problem. After the printing press, the
problem was not how you control the fruit of your creative labor; it was
how do you prevent others from stealing it instantly because anybody
who gets the copy has got the know-how. That is really what literary
and artistic property law is all about. It is the know-how, the skilled
effort, that is embodied on the face of the book.
That is why there are these strong parallels between design laws
and artistic property law, not because they are true artistic parallels,
rather they are both vulnerable to instant appropriation. Each type of
creation bears its know-how on its face. Our whole world copyright system was built on this underlying empirical premise, and suddenly it
begins to change at the end of the twenty-first century. Suddenly, we
revert to a variant of the earlier, more primitive system. The electronic
database that is of considerable scientific or industrial importance will
be communicated all over the world. And yet, you can keep the source
in your factory and build a wall around it, and unless somebody can
cut into the line or into somebody else's line, they cannot get it.
PROFESSOR LANGE: I do not think that the fences can be
maintained except in large settings, where contract law I think historically works pretty well. I think it will not be possible to fence off the
small change uses in the world that lie ahead and that is really what I
think is going to happen.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: I hope you are right.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Jerry [Reichman], I enjoyed your talk
very much. Could I get you to address this question? Our only experience with modifying copyright protection is in the Chip Act. Would
you characterize what you think that teaches us, if anything, that is
relevant to this and would you tell what interests of the software providers would be served by their advocating such a thing?
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Let me say first that what you are
going to see in my paper on Legal Hybrids is that the Chip Act is one
of nearly twenty legal hybrids. It may be less interesting than the treatment of. the engineering projects in three different legal systems, the
Italian system, the German system, and our own system. In the U.S., if
you draw a project, say, a project for a boiler or a noncopyrightable
building, and you reduce it to a drawing, the two-dimensional version
of the drawing is protectible. But anybody can go and reverse engineer
the building or the boiler. That is simply a codified version of Baker v.
Selden directed at graphic works; I submit that the uncodified version
applies to the verbal description as well. German law approaches it differently by imposing a very high standard of creativity. Italian law actually creates a hybrid regime, even puts a compulsory royalty on
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third-party use of the project, but allows that use without prior authorization. So, Leo [Raskind], my point in saying this is, I do not think you
i should single out the Chip Act as more or less important than other
hybrid regimes that are dealing imperfectly with a common family of
problems.
Mort Goldberg would now be the first one to say the Chip Act is a
disaster, but many others would disagree. To me, the Chip Act is important because it tries to develop a portable trade secret regime that
will be valid against the world. The trouble is, it singles out one class of
functional designs for preferential treatment for no justifiable reason. It
is simply a step towards discovering the common denominator underlying all the hybrids, which I call "applied scientific know-how."
All of these legal hybrids, every single one of them, teaches us
something new. Every one of them has something that others lack,
something wonderful. If you could just get rid of the junk and select
the good aspects of each of these fifteen or twenty hybrid regimes, you
might find an ideal innovation law right there. But I do agree the Chip
Act has a lot to teach us. I think you, Pam [Samuelson], and Richard
Stern saw that already in the Minnesota symposium. But I do not want
to isolate the lessons of the Chip Act from those of the other hybrid
regimes.
Why should the copyright industries be eager to hear about these
lessons? I think I have told Mort Goldberg a hundred times in different
symposiums (if I could only reach his principals!) . . . I think he is
wasting their time and money by not listening to the results of this
inquiry because they are not going to get from copyright law what they
want for very long. I think the sunset of Whelan is at hand, just as I
predicted. I always said, when we met in Arizona, that we have to
thank our lucky stars for Whelan. That decision accelerated the process
of demistifying copyright law by ten or fifteen years. As soon as you
read Whelan, you realize copyright law cannot work and will not work
as a technology or innovation law. It will not work any more than the
judicial attempt to protect functional designs in English copyright law
worked in the period 1968-1988, for the reasons that I have told you.
In the end, all the road builders will be arguing about who owns which
bend in the road; all it will do for sure is protect against the clumsy
infringer who takes the code wholesale. "
I do not advocate rejecting copyright protection of computer programs if it prevents copying of the external code; we are not starting
with a clean slate. But I think that the computer industry and the information processing industry, in general, share the very same
problems that the biogenetic engineering industry faces today. A design
problem
is what you are really talking about. You are structuring these
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/9
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components in a particular way, and there is no place to go to protect
the truly valuable combination. And that is why I think Mort Goldberg
and his people should be listening to this because we are trying to develop a type of protection-very short-term, very soft-that mediates
and brokers between free competition and the stronger forms of monopoly extant within the intellectual property system.
We want a regime that allows innovators to recuperate their investment before, say, the other guy takes the cure for cancer in the
form of a bug and duplicates it at little cost even though it has cost the
innovator ten million man-hours. Yet, this innovator who cures concern
may have added nothing to the historical concept of medicine. You
have not added anything to the historical concept of medicine. You just
went down another gene-splicing track. That is what is happening in
digital processing, too. Think of where artificial intelligence is going,
for example. In the long run-you can not do it very well now-you
have got to standardize components, and you are going to have these
advanced machines working on standardized databases with the standardized component. Are you going to allow anybody who has ever
contributed to the history of computer science to claim derivative work
rights in twenty-first century artificial intelligence?
That is what copyright protection of technological innovation leads
to. And since courts will not do that, you will not get anything like the
scope of protection that the pro-copyright camp really wants. Indeed,
the other place where I think Mort Goldberg is making a very serious
mistake is the belief that strong copyright protection of technology is
going to be good for America. We heard in the 1950s that what was
good for General Motors was good for America. Well, we all know
where that got us-and General Motors. I fear it will be the same sort
of thing here because in ten years or so, in order for us to remain competitive, we are going to have to copy the foreign innovations in computer technology. And we may not be able to do it because they are
going to come over and try to shove Whelan v. Jaslow down our
throats, if it is still law. They are going to say, very well, you guys
wanted life plus fifty years of hard protection on very soft conditions,
and that is what we want too, and that is what we are going to get
because of the national treatment clause of the Berne Convention. That
is what is going to happen, mark my words.
MR. METALITZ: If I could just put two cents worth in on the
Chip Act. What happened with the Chip Act is that an issue that was
conceived of in intellectual property terms has become a contract issue.
The reason there have been no cases under the Chip Protection Act is
because of cross licensing which did not exist when the Chip Act was
first conceived
of. At
the time it was enacted, it was the industry norm.
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So all of these disputes have been decided as contract disputes. I guess
this is the area in which contracts do work. This is not consumers sitting at home redesigning the microchip.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: But there is a happy possibility for
us to correlate because the Japanese always said we will do whatever is
"right." They said we had to decide whether to protect chip designs or
not. If not protected, they are going to copy them. If protected, they
could license them. So then we had to come up with a form of protection, but we do not use unfair competition law for this purpose, as in
some European countries. Are we going to fashion a similar law for
every technology? At the rate we are going, every new technology that
comes up, we shall have to pass a new intellectual property law or
adapt an old one, like copyright law. Somehow I have a feeling that is
not a very elegant solution.
PROFESSOR GORDON: This really follows up your point, Jerry
[Spiegel]. He asked isn't there something a little bit bizarre about a
world in which the rich and poor have differential access to information. I do not know what happened to Dennis [Karjala], but in Dennis'
paper he gives an example of information access. He says only scholars
deserve fair use. By implication, scholars are not going to need access
to these databases immediately so what you can have is high protection
in the short run to safeguard monetary value of databases, and then the
scholars can come around later. And the natural question is this: Is it
not just scholars we care about? There may be people out there who
want to read, to react commercially, and are not rich enough to get the
money together to buy the license to get the instantaneous access, and
yet they may have judgments and abilities we want to use but we can
only use if they have access.
So, getting back to Jerry Reichman's point, you have a problem of
inequity between rich and poor having access to something that we
might consider equal entitlement of us all, maybe, information as
Americans. And, second, there is an economic and efficiency point. If
you bar access to information only to those who have already been successful in the market, only those who already have a lot of money, you
may be precluding us from getting the benefit of a lot of newcomers
with innovative ideas and expertise. One little footnote to this is somebody says this is a brand new problem. There is nothing new under the
sun, as we keep hearing about in intellectual property law, among other
places. If Jerry [Reichman] is right, there are not going to be any market barriers, and if he is not right, we might have something like Jane
Ginsburg's compulsory license fee to eliminate market barriers. You
could end up in a world where a market in all this stuff is completely
and utterly impossible.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/9
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Right now a lot of free use is protected or allowed because markets just do not work. If indeed markets are completely practicable, it
may force us to bite the normative bullet. That is, are there some
things we just do not want markets in? And that is not a new question.
The clearest example of the merit good is that we are all supposed
to have equal access to the law. That is why we do not allow judges to
buy and sell their votes on important cases. That is a market we do not
allow. Other less important examples illustrate the range; we do not
allow blackmail, which is the buying and selling of silence, and many
states do not allow prostitution, which is the buying and selling of sexual favors. Some states do not allow surrogate mother contract, which
is the buying and selling of ovarian services. I think a good argument
can be made on several levels which echo the First Amendment but all
are not limited to the First Amendment, that maybe there is something
special about information that has a noneconomic dimension, which requires equal access on justice grounds. Now, in my own thinking I have
not gotten to the bottom of that issue, but I do not think it is an issue
that is just relegated to the legal question: Is it constitutional? I think
it is a legitimate policy dimension of everything everyone is talking
about.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: I really think that many of the issues
you point out are not new. Certainly the economic access issue has long
been with us. The rich have always had the same right to sleep under
the bridge as the homeless have. But when we start talking about that,
we have to do some hard thinking about the kinds of information we
are going to protect, if we decide to protect any. On the question of the
market efficiency, however, and who has to have access in order to
make the market efficient, we have to remember-although I do not
know whether the empirical line is drawn-that nobody gets information that is not created, and so we have to worry about information that
is not going to get created if we do not give a return as you, I am sure,
agree. And so the question is where to draw the line. If we do have to
draw the line, some will not have the information because of protection;
that may make the market less efficient than it would be if everyone
had access to it, but on the other hand, it may be more efficient than if
the information was not going to be created at all.
MR. CUTLER: I just want to make one point about the Chip Act.
I guess being lawyers everybody thinks the Chip Act a failure because
nobody sues anybody under it. If you look at the industry, the Chip Act
is an enormous success, the reason why today that computers now fits
on the table down there because of the significant advances in chips.
And it did not come from IBM, Texas Instruments, or any of these
peoplebywho
wanted 1991
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cause of the free dissemination of information and the industrial advancement under the Chip Act that significantly contributed to it. That
is where all, almost all of the advances in the computer industry came
from. It is a great success. It helped industry. It helped the world advance enormously. It may not have allowed lawyers to sue each other
frequently.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: What in the Chip Act in particular?
Are you talking about the analytical use provision?
MR. CUTLER: Absolutely.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Is there evidence that people are relying on that to design new chips and so forth?
MR. CUTLER: Absolutely. Yes. They have contractual rights
which are also observed, but that particular process has led to a pace of
innovation which to call it dizzying is an underestimate.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Certain companies, whose names I
will not mention but whose presence is always with us, are going
around the world suggesting that the Chip Act-and I am curious to
hear Leo's reaction to this-that it was a monstrosity. Of course, there
has been a failure to get an agreement on it internationally, but as I
have explained in other forums, that had to do with larger tensions
facing the GATT negotiations. The developing nations were not going
to give anybody any illusions about what they faced down the road, so
they were not going to make any concessions with respect to chips until
the global negotiations produced reciprocal concessions to them, which
still have yet to emerge. So I do not see that as a major flaw in the
scheme.
Still, there is a lot of loose talk around the world that the Chip
Act is a monstrosity, an example of what not to do. This is because the
technological assumptions quickly became obsolete. Now, at the time of
the Minnesota symposium, in which Richard Stern and Pam Samuelson participated, there was a lot of thinking about the Chip Act as a
model for a sui generis law to regulate computer programs. Stern actually did a piece about what a sui generis law for software might include, which is quite ingenious. It is refreshing to hear someone say
something good about the Chip Act as an operative law. What is your
impression, Leo [Raskind], given that you asked the question about the
Chip Act?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I do not ask questions to which I know
the answer. It is a complicated process. In part there is not much litigation in the process of replication, which was in place during the deliberations, has changed and so now it is not so readily at low cost copyable.
So it is .a complicated process.
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PROFESSOR REICHMAN: You put your finger on what I think
has led some to label it as a monstrosity. The law was obsolete in relation to the technology when it was enacted. Leo [Raskind], is not that
a fair characterization of it?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I do not think at the time the consensus emerged in the industry to seek legislation that the technology was
there. The duration of the deliberate legislative process may have
brought that about, but I think basically it set a framework in which
everybody understands there are some limitations, and I think the industry does get some credit for having been innovative at a rapid rate.
And what is cause and what is effect, I am not fully prepared to say.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: The conclusion that certain quarters
want to draw from this experience is that we should never have a sui
generis law. My conclusion is completely different. Let's fashion a sui
generis law for innovation that is not going to be so technology specific.
Rather than develop a new law for each new technology, we need a
general purpose technology law to which we can add a few postulates
from time to time to refine the treatment of specific technologies.
Look at the Berne Convention, for example. You have a paradigm.
It does not fully work for us; films were initially a big puzzle. But because we have a dominant paradigm that works, we solve puzzles with
it. That is what paradigms do; they facilitate ordinary puzzle-solving.
So we solve these puzzles with regard to other closer related works,
such as films. Nobody thought all these Berne-protected subject matters were related at the beginning. The model was books and then
gradually it expanded to include even films.
Similarly, if we have an innovation law, we may have to add a
clause here and a clause there to accomodate the peculiarities of certain technologies, rather than trying to have a law for each technology.
I guess that is what I have learned from my study of legal hybrids.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I suppose you could respond to that
another way. You could say given the rapid rate of technology maybe
what you need to do is mobilize different resources. Maybe the Congress could delegate authority to the National Institute of Health to
come up with a framework, through its administrative law and regulations promulgations, certain parameters of protection that would be
flexible. Maybe you can learn that from the Chip Act. And so they
would have to review and then the industry, the biotechnology industry,
and the public interest people in that forum where you have the expertise would get together. Then they might promulgate a framework of
regulations provisionally with maybe a sunset provision that might be
what you might draw from the experience of the Chip Act.
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